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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
STATE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE PIPELINES
NATURAL GAS ACT
The Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company delivers natural
gas from its interstate pipeline to distributing utilities and
to industrial consumers in Indiana. The Public Service Com-
mission of Indiana ordered that it file with the Commission
its tariffs covering rates, rules, and regulations in regard to
industrial sales and to make annual reports "in connection
with the regulation of rates and service . . . " The Pipeline
Company thereupon brought a statutory action1 for review of
the order praying that it be vacated and its enforcement en-
joined. The judgment of Randolph County Circuit Court find-
ing the industrial sales to be interstate commerce exempt from
state regulation was reversed by the Indiana Supreme Court.
It was held that even considered as interstate commerce the
industrial sales may be regulated by the state since they are
without the field occupied by the Natural Gas Act2 and of a
local nature not burdening interstate commerce. Public Serv-
ice Commission v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 71 N. E.
2d 117 (Ind.1947), probable jurisdiction noted, 67 S.Ct. 1352
(1947).
I
The first question is the determination of whether Con-
gress acted in regard to direct industrial sales in its enact-
ment of the Natural Gas Act. Before the passage of that
Act it had been held by the Supreme Court that the several
states might regulate the price of burner-tip sales of natural
gas from local distributing companies to domestic consum-
ers.3 If the transporting pipeline company also operated
the local distribution facilities and sold directly to local con-
sumers, the state public service commissions had jurisdiction
1. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 54-429.
2. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1939).
3. Public Utilities Comm. v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236 (1919).
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over the consumer sales.' But where the sale was by the
pipeline company to a local distributing company, i.e., a whole-
sale sale, the states were held to be constitutionally powerless
to regulate on the ground that it was interstate commerce
national in character5 The motivating purpose of the enact-
ment of the Natural Gas Act was to subject these sales for
resale to federal regulation. The Act applies to: (1) trans-
portation of natural gas in interstate commerce, (2) the sale
in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate
public consumption for domestic, commercial, or industrial
use, (3) natural gas companies so engaged.7
Congressman Halleck of Indiana discussed on the floor
of the House the status of a manufacturer who buys directly
from a pipeline company. He concluded that "this bill seeks
only to reach those sales when the sale is for resale to the
ultimate consumer. So a purchaser for industrial use, who
bought the gas, not for resale, but for consumption in his
own plant, would not be reached by the measure."8 The rate
regulatory power of the Federal Power Commission being
over sales "for resale" only, the Commission has recognized it
does not have jurisdiction over sales direct to industrial con-
sumers., And the Supreme Court has termed industrial sales
"unregulated business," saying that "The Commission, while
it lacks authority to fix rates for direct industrial sales, may
4. Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 252 U.S. 23 (1920);
accord, East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm. of Ohio, 283 U.S. 465
(1931). Where the distributing company was affiliated with the
selling company the state commission could demand that the whole-
sale rate be a fair and reasonable one. Western Distributing Co.
v. Public Service Comm. of Kansas, 285 U.S. 119 (1932).
5. Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924); Public Service
Comm. v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
See State Corporation Comm. v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561,
563 (1934); Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 270
U.S. 550, 554 (1926).
6. The charge of a what-the-traffic-will-bear rate at the "city-gate,"
a sale over which the state commission had no authority, handi-
capped their regulation of burner-tip rates, since the wholesale
rate is the most potent factor in the determination of the retail
rate. This fact was illustrated by House debate on the Natural
Gas Act. It appeared that at that time domestic rates averaged
74.6 cents per 1000 cubic feet, while rates to industrial consumers,
where a competitive situation with other fuels, notably coal, ex-
ists, the price was 16.9 cents per 1000 cubic feet. 81 Cong. Rec.
6721 (1937).
7. 52 Stat. 821 § 201(b) (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1939).
8. 81 Cong. Rec. 6723 (1937).
9. Re Cities Service Gas Co., 50 P.U.R. (N.S.) 65, 89 (1943).
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take those rates into consideration when it fixes the rates
for interstate wholesale sales which are subject to its juris-
diction."1 The Natural Gas Act, then, was specific legisla-
tion for a specific need (regulation of sale for resale of nat-
ural gas in interstate commerce) and direct sales to industrial
consumers are beyond its language and purpose.
In the principal case the Indiana Court was able to in-
fer from the legislative history of the Act and Supreme Court
pronouncements as to the legislative purpose that "those trans-
actions over which jurisdiction was not given to the Federal
Power Commission may be considered as local matters and
left to state regulatory bodies."'1  Doubtless the meaning
here is that no regulatory power was taken away from the
states by the Natural Gas Act. In this connection it is to
be noted that the states were not regulating industrial sales
at the time the Act was passed and have not been able to do
so prior to the present decision.12
If it could be said that Congress added to the states'
authority by delegating to them a portion of its supreme
power under the commerce clause in passing the Act, there
would be no necessity to inquire whether this would be a per-
missible activity under the Constitution.13 The Act does pro-
vide, after its positive grants, that it "shall not apply to . ..
10. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 324
U.S. 635, 646 (1945).
11. 71 N.E.2d 117, 124 (Ind. 1947).
12. The holding has been that where the pipeline company, as in the
instant case, transports gas from out of the state and delivers it to
industrial consumers without storing in compliance with a con-
tract, it is engaged in interstate commerce and is not subject to
the jurisdiction of the state commission. Cities Service Gas Co.
v. Public Service Comm.. 337 Mo. 809, 85 S.W.2d 890 (1935), cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 657 (1936); accord, Sioux City, Iowa v. Missouri
Valley Pipe Line Co., 46 F.2d 819 (D.C. Iowa 1931); Re Colorado
Interstate Gas Co., P.U.R. 1933E 349 (1933). See Columbia Gas
& Electric Corp. v. U.S., 151 F.2d 461, 463-4 (C.C.A. 6th 1945);
Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm., 34
F.Supp. 980 (D.C. La. 1940). In the industry the present decision
is considered to be a "test case." Crosby, "Which Way Does FPC
Gas Probe Point?" 38 P.U. Fort. 464, 467 (1946).
13. Limitations, if any, on Congressional authorization of state tax-
ation and regulation of interstate commerce, are beyond the scope
of this note. The rule has been stated that "Where the federal
legislation authorizes state action, such state action is permissible
even as to matters which could otherwise be regulated only by
uniform national enactments." Black, J., in Cloverleaf Butter Co.
v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 155 n. 4 (1942). See So. Pac. Co. v.
Ariz., 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945); Note, "Congressional Consent to
Discriminatory State Legislation," 45 Col. L. Rev. 927 (1945).
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the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for
such distribution . . . "14 However, this negative command
should not operate as an affirmative authorization to the
states to regulate beyond their constitutional power by im-
posing what would otherwise be an undue burden on interstate
commerce in the manner of the legislation upheld in Pru-
dential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin.15 What may be said with
assurance in this case is only that there was a Congressional
intent at the time of passing the Act not to deprive the states
of any jurisdiction they were then exercising, but rather to
supplement their regulatory scheme in a field in which the
states were constitutionally unable to act.16 Congress has
therefore not acted in respect to industrial sales either by
conferring jurisdiction over them upon the Federal Power
Commission, or by authorizing the states to assert such au-
thority.
We now reach the question of whether the commerce
clause "of its own force" prohibits state regulation of direct
industrial sales.
Whether sales to industrial consumers by the pipeline
company are in interstate commerce or are in intrastate com-
merce should not be a conclusive determination of state reg-
ulatory power. In either case the sales may be subject to
state authority. However, in past cases arising under the
regulation of this industry the Court has reached the re-
sult that where intrastate commerce was involved the states
could regulate;17 but with the exception of the decision in
Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm.,18 where inter-
state commerce was at issue, it was held that the states could
not exercise this power. 19 This approach is not in accord with
the climate of the present Court. Nevertheless, those cases
are part of the history of the principal case and it should be
considered whether the court, under them, could appropriately
14. See n. 7 supra.
15. 328 U.S. 408 (1946), 46 Col. L. Rev. 882, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1197.
16. See Public Utilities Comm. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456,
467 (1943).
17. Public Utilities Comm. v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236 (1919).
18. 252 U.S. 23 (1920).
19. Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U.S. 236 (1924).
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term thp industrial sales "intrastate commerce" and thus
never arrive at the commerce clause question.
The first in a series of tests distinguishing interstate
commerce from intrastate commerce in distribution of natural
gas came in Public Utilities Comm. v. Landon.20 It was there
held that the movement in interstate commerce ended when
the gas passed into the "local mains" of the distributing com-
pany. But in the Pennsylvania Gas Co. case where the local
mains were owned by the pipeline company which sold the
gas directly to the local consumer the entire transaction was
stated to be interstate commerce. The inconsistency of these
holdings was noted in East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm. of
Ohio.21 There the Pennsylvania Gas Co. case was criticized by
the Court22 and a second test laid down: The step-down in
pressure when the gas passes from the pipeline into the local
distribution lines was compared by the court to the breaking of
an "original package"2 3 after shipment in interstate commerce,
and therefore the movement of gas in interstate commerce
was declared at an end at the step-down.24 But that test is of
doubtful contemporary utility, as it was argued in vain in
Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Co.2 5 The Supreme
Court there applied a third test, finding that the company was
"engaged in interstate commerce in the purchase and sale of
the natural gas which moves in a continuous stream from
points without the state into appellant's pipes within the
20. 249 U.S. 236 (1919).
21. 283 U.S. 465 (1931).
22. Id. at 471: "The theory on which that conclusion was reached [that
the gas continued in interestate commerce to burner-tips] is not
wholly consistent with the views expressed in Public Utilities Comm.
v. Landon and in Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., . . . It does not
appear that there were presented, in Pennsylvania Gas Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm., to the state court or here the considerations
on which it is held that interstate commerce ends and intrastate
business begins when gas flowing through pipe lines from out-
side the state passes into local distribution systems for delivery to
consumers in the municipalities served. But, however that may be,
the opinion in that case must be disapproved to the extent that
it is in conflict with our decision here."
23. Southern Natural Gas Corp. v. Ala., 301 U.S. 148 (1938); Hoover
& Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945); Leisy v. Hardin, 135
U.S. 100 (1890); Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (U.S. 1827).
See Gavit, "Commerce Clause" 125-30, § 72 (1932).
24. For a criticism of the view that the issue is one of "physics"
see Powell, Note, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 1072 (1945).
25. 314 U.S. 498 (1942).
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State . . . "26 That this "continuous stream" test alone is an
inadequate criterion admits itself to easy demonstration.
Thus, in the Illinois Natural Gas Co. case the continuous
movement of the gas progressed not only through the first
step-down in pressure from the interstate pipeline to the Gas
Company but also through the second reduction of pressure
when the gas passed from the wholesaler's facilities into the
service mains of local distributors. The consequence is that
the gas on arrival at burner-tips of individual consumers is
moving in interstate commerce. Yet the Court has uniformly
held that sales by the distributor to local consumers are intra-
state commerce.27 It is probable that the test was not meant
to be applied through the second delivery and reduction of
pressure.
In applying these tests to the fact situation here pre-
sented we find that the pressure of the gas is reduced from
200 pounds per square inch to 80 or 100 pounds per square
inch upon leaving the main line. The gas then flows through
a lateral to a meter house where the pressure is further re-
duced, and then deliveries are made to the industrial consum-
er at a pressure of from 40 pounds to 10 pounds per square
inch. Deliveries are made to the local distribution company
at 9 to 25 pounds pressure per square inch. Whatever vitality
remains to the "original package" doctrine after the Illinois
Natural Gas Co. case would therefore mechanically determine
the interstate movement on the reduction of pressure, and the
sale to industrial consumers would be intrastate commerce.
The Indiana Supreme Court in the principal case, while not
passing on the point, was impressed with the manifest ab-
surdity of this result. It is clear under previous cases that
the delivery of gas to distributing utilities, which was made
at substantitally identical pressure and conditions as that to
the industrial consumer, is interstate commerce. 28 It would
be vulnerable reasoning which would hold the distributor fork
of the pipeline interstate commerce and the industrial fork
intrastate conunerce, because of a possible analogy to the
breaking of an "original package." There remain the "local
26. Id. at 513. See Macey, Note, 27 Corn L. Q. 399 (1942).
27. East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm., 283 U.S. 465 (1931); Public
Utilities Comm. v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236 (1919).
28. See n. 5 supra.
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mains"' 29 and the "continuous stream"30 mechanical tests; and
if the Court uses either the principal case presents a trans-
action constituting interstate commerce.
The Court cannot, consequently, avoid now deciding
whether the commerce clause prohibits the state regulation
of the price paid for gas by industrials. The Court has not
previously passed on the point31 It is to be expected that
in doing so it will follow the approach indicated by Mr. Chief
Justice Stone in the Illinois Natural Gas Co. case, supra. On
this supposition they will be "less concerned to find a point in
time and space where the interstate commerce in gas ends
and intrastate commerce begins" but rather will confront
the question he posed as to "whether the interest of the state
in the present regulation of the sale and distribution of gas
29. Public Utilities Comm. v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236 (1919).
30. Il1. Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U.S. 498 (1942).
31. The case nearest in point is Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Dept.
of Public Utilities, 304 U.S. 61 (1937). There the Gas Company
transported gas from Texas and Louisiana to Arkansas and the
gas was (1) sold directly to industries, (2) sold to local distrib-
utors for resale, (3) distributed by the gas company itself acting
as a public utility through a separate distribution department. The
state commission ordered that schedules of rates and charges be
submitted, and the case came up in the same manner as the prin-
cipal case. It was held that the requiring of the reports would
not "materially burden or unduly interfere with the free flow of
commerce" but "in case the Department undertakes by some
future action to impose what may be deemed unreasonable re-
straint or burden upon appellant's interstate business, through rate
regulation or otherwise, that may be contested." Id. at 63. In that
case however, it was not clear that the state commission had assert-
ed regulatory jurisdiction over the industrial sales. Also through a
separate department the company sold to household consumers by
a means of local distribution facilities. The latter factor would
tend to make the information of greater import to the state com-
mission. Cf. Southern Natural Gas Corp. v. Ala., 301 U.S. 148(1937). Alabama imposed a franchise tax on the gas company,
a Delaware corporation with its commercial domicile in Alabama.
The Gas company sold natural gas to three distributing utilities
and one industrial consumer, the Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad
Company. Utilizing the "original package" doctrine the tax was
sustained, the Court stating "from the agreed facts we are unable
to conclude that the business thus conducted in Alabama was en-
tirely an interstate business." See Stone, C.J., in Ill. Natural Gas
Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U.S. 498, 506 (1942): "In Southern
Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148, 156-7, on which the Illinois Su-
preme Court relied, we held only that the sale of gas to a local
industrial consumer by one who was piping the gas into the state
was a local business sufficient to sustain a franchise tax on the
privilege of doing business within the state, measured by all the
taxpayer's property located there, including that used for whole-
sale distribution of gas to local public service companies."
1947]
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transported in the state, balanced against the effect of such
control on the commerce in its national aspect, is a more reli-
able touchstone for ascertaining state power than [are] . . .
mechanical distinctions . . . "32
The essentiality, of uniform regulation by a single au-
thority is an important aspect of the elusive "undue burden"
test 3 In the principal case the Indiana Court found that
uniformity of control of industrial sales was unnecessary and
inferred that this was also the conception of Congress when
it did not include such sales in its field of regulation. As a
necessary consequence it was decided that the local interest
is paramount. In the able opinion written by Judge Young,
it was reasoned that the state controls all other consumer
sales, and if it is' not allowed to extend its regulatory powers
to industrial sales the latter will be unregulated, at least for
the moment. Such a result is "a weighty consideration in
balancing national interest against local need." 4
In MWissouri v. Kansas Gas Co. it was held that as to
sales to distributors "The paramount interest is not local but
national-admitting of and requiring uniformity of regula-
tion."35 The 'basis on which that case could be distinguished
from the principal one is that distributor sales are sales for
resale while the direct sales to industrial consumers are sales
for consumption.2 That this differentiative treatment is valid
is given support by the Pennsylvania Gas Co. case, supra,
where it was held that direct sales to local consumers of a
municipality were subject to state rate regulation although
interstate commerce.8 7 This case has surprisingly been a
source of embarrassment to the Supreme Court.8 Its import-
32. ill. Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U.S. 498, 505-6(1942).
33. See So. Pac. Co. v. Ariz., 325 U.S. 761, 768 (1945).
34. 71 N.E.2d 117, 125 (Ind. 1947).
35. 265 U.S. 298, 309 (1924).
36. The consumer sale aspect impressed Professor Powell. See Note,
58 Harv. L. Rev. 1072, 1082 (1945).
37. "The service is similar to that of a local plant furnishing gas to
consumers in a city.
"This local Service is not of that character which requires
general and uniform regulation of rates by congressional action,
and which has always been held beyond the power of the States,
although Congress has not legislated upon the subject." 252 U.S.
23, 31.
38. See n. 22 supra.
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ance as precedent, if any, would seem to be that a pipeline
company which acts in the capacity of a local distributing
utility may be subject to rate regulation in the same manner
as are local distributing companies.
The two lines of precedent then are the burner-tip sale to
domestic consumers (states may regulate even where the sale
is interstate commerce, as diversity of regulation is permis-
sible) and the sale to the distributing company (states may
not regulate, uniformity being essential). The direct indus-
trial sale for consumption fits neither category with exacti-
tude. With which is it more readily identifiable?
It is similar to the burner-tip sale in that it is a sale
for consumption. The states have an interest in regulating
that sale in order to preserve equality of economic oppor-
tunity among intrastate industrial concerns. And further,
if the pipeline may undercut local distributing companies in
sales to industry and take this business away from them, the
rate burden on local householders will be increased and the
state-wide system of regulation imperiled.19 The states will
be in position of impotence which, though not of equal
degree, is comparable to their handcuffed status before the
distributor sale was subjected to federal regulation.40 These
factors are the measure of the several states' interests in
this regulation.
On the other hand, there are similarities between the
industrial sale and the distributor sale. In one community
a single industrial sale may even exceed in volume the dis-
39. In Public Utilities Comm. v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co.,
273 U.S. 83 (1927), the state commission argued that it could not
effectively regulate sales to local consumers unless it was given
power to regulate the distributor sale. Held: "Being the imposi-
tion of a direct burden upon interstate commerce from which the
State is restrained by the force of the Commerce Clause, it must
necessarily fall, regardless of its purpose . . .. [What Rhode
Island could do for the benefit of its consumers Massachusetts
could likewise do, ad infinitum] . . . . The rate is therefore not
subject to regulation by either of the two states in the guise of
protection to their respective local interests; but, if such regulation
is required it can only be attained by the exercise of the power
vested in Congress." 273 U.S. 83, 89-90. Cf. the recent case of
Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440, 449 (1946): "And in view
of the well-known conditions of competition in this field, such a
result not only would free out-of-state insurance companies and
their representatives of the regulation's effect, thus giving them
advantage over local competitors, but by so doing would tend to
break down the system of regulation in its purely local operation."
40. See n. 6 supra.
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tributor sale which will serve the domestic consumers of the
entire area.41 The industrial sale is not an "on demand"
sale to domestic consumers but the gas is transported extra-
state and delivered pursuant to a private contract. Regula-
tion of these sales reaches back of the state line through
interim states to the gas field, just as regulation of sales for
resale.42 There is a question whether the state commissions
have the machinery adequately to appraise the complex finan-
cial situation of large pipeline companies in order to determine
industirial consumer price structure.43  There is a further
problem as to whether the facilities of the state public service
commissions are adaptable to taking the natural second step
by fixing quantities of gas to be delivered to state industrial
consumers and concomitantly safeguarding local and indus-
trial consumers' interests in sister states.
The above apply with equal force to distributor sales
and indicate that as a factual matter it is with difficulty that
the industrial sale is distinguished from them. As previously
noted the states were held to be powerless to regulate dis-
tributor sales. Nevertheless, their interest in doing so here
remains. Admitting that if the effect on commerce and the
inconsistency with basic commerce clause purpose be consider-
ed, the principal case and the distributor sale cases cannot be
realistically distinguished, does it follow that the state action
must be struck down? The answer is a negative one. The
41. In the principal case the annual sale to the industrial consumer
was regularly ten times larger in volume than the sale to the
distributing company.
42. See Dowling, "Interstate Commerce and State Power," 27 Va. L.
Rev. 1, 15 (1940), quoting Stone, J., in South Carolina Highway
Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n. 2 (1938): ". . . when
the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls princi-
pally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely
to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally ex-
erted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within
the State."
43. The Federal Power Commission has found that as to the entire
Panhandle Eastern system "these lines constitute the longest nat-
ural-gas pipe line in the world, serving more than 200 cities, towns,
and communities with more than 700,000 retail customers m Texas,
Kansas, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio." Detroit
v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 45 P.U.R. (N.S.) 203, 208
(1942), noted in Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Federal Power
Comm., 324 U.S. 635, 637 (1945). But see Natural Gas Act, 52
Stat. 821, § 17(c) (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717p(c) (1939). "The
Commission shall make available to the several State Commissions
such information and reports as may be of assistance in State re-
gulation of natural gas companies."
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factors enumerated which presumably influenced the Court
to declare in the distributor sale cases that there could be uni-
form regulation only by national authority are not of suf-
ficient weight in the aggregate to lead to that conclusion
when balanced against the interest of the states in regulating
industrial sales, the problem which here struggles for atten-
tion and solution.
State efforts toward regulation of distributor sales have
been pre-empted by the Natural Gas Act. This should make
easier the acceptance of the suggestion here advanced that
the Court, although the same result might be achieved by
distinguishing them, should simply decline to follow those
cases which held distributor sales to be beyond state power.
The urgent local interest of the state indicates that there
should be regulation. If this were equally true of the dis-
tributor sale cases, then let us frankly admit that they were
ill-advised. Or more properly phrased, other approaches to
reconciling state and federal power now press for recognition,
and under present conceptions of sustaining both federal and
state action where it is possible to do so a contrary result
should be reached. 44 The door is ever left open for the su-
preme voice of Congress to speak. It should be unnecessary
idly to abide that contingency. In the interim, industrial sales
may be declared to admit of diversity of regulation and con-
sequently to be within reach of the state. A complementary
system of state and federal regulatory power should not fail
in this "crucial situation."' 5 If it is not to do so the state ac-
tion must be upheld.
44. "But, just as in recent years the permissible scope for congres-
sional commerce action has broadened, returning to Marshall's
conception, the prohibitive effect of the clause has been progressive-
ly narrowed. The trend has been toward sustaining state regula-
tion formerly regarded as inconsistent with Congress' unexercised
power over commerce. To the extent this has occurred, the posi-
tive and negative pendulums have moved more and more in uni-
son, not as mutually exclusive but as more mutually tolerant."
Rutedge, "A Declaration of Legal Faith" 68 (1947).
45. See Final Report of the Federal Trade Commission to the Senate,
Sen. Doc. 92, Pt. 84-A, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 612 (1936): "Gas
and pipe-line companies have asserted in some instances that they
are solely within state jurisdiction and in other instances that they
are so engaged in interstate commerce as to be entirely beyond
state jurisdiction, whichever the exigencies of the particular case
might seem to demand. There is a jurisdiction, either state or
national which covers the entire country. Federal jurisdiction
should be so utilized and coordinated as to produce effective reg-
lation and the termination of existing abuses and leave no unreg-
ulated twilight zone. Otherwise our system fails in a very crucial
situation."
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